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Written Testimony of Philip Hackney
Associate Professor of Law
University of Pittsburgh School of Law
Pennsylvania House State Government Committee
DONOR DISCLOSURE AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATIONS: REVIEWING RECENT
LEGAL PRECEDENTS.
February 7, 2022
Chair Grove, Chair Conklin, members of the committee, thank you for inviting
me here today to speak with you about a matter of great importance to the operation
and regulation of our shared Commonwealth. I am from Representative Jessica
Benham’s district 36 in the South Side of Pittsburgh. I understand you have asked me to
speak to the issue of donor disclosure related to campaign finance and particularly the
consideration of how the recent United States Supreme Court case Americans for
Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta 1 impacts that regulatory landscape.
0F

I am an associate professor of law at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law
where I teach primarily about tax law. I specialize in the tax obligations of nonprofit
organizations. From 2006-2011, I worked in the Office of the Chief Counsel of the IRS in
Washington D.C. overseeing the tax-exempt sector. There I helped to oversee the
drafting of regulations, the overall program of auditing tax exempt organizations, and
the litigation of the IRS on matters related to tax laws applicable to nonprofits and
government entities. That work necessarily interacted in a robust way with politics. The
IRS oversees dark money organizations, section 527 political organizations, and
charities that engage in politics in its largest sense. Today, I write, research, and speak
about these organizations and the regulatory regime that is applicable to them. I have
significant depth of knowledge about the tax laws related to these organizations, the
state nonprofit regulatory regime that applies to them, and as a result an understanding,
though not an expertise in campaign finance law. Thus, my expectation is that the best
way I can help your committee is in understanding the complex of regulatory regimes
that work to oversee this terrain, the relationship between these different regimes, and
hopefully also the object and importance of each individual regulatory regime. 2
1F

Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta
In 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court in Americans for Prosperity Foundation v.
Bonta struck down as facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment a law in
California requiring charities soliciting donations in the state of California to disclose

Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 141 S.Ct. 2373 (2021).
I note that this testimony is informed in part by articles I have written including Political Justice and
Tax Policy: The Social Welfare Organizations Case, 8 TEX. A&M L. REV. 271 (2021) and Dark Money
Darker? IRS Shutters Collection of Donor Data, 25 FLA. TAX REV. _ (forthcoming 2022) [hereinafter
Dark Money Darker].
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substantial donors identified on Schedule B to the IRS Form 990. 3 The Form 990 is the
information tax return nonprofits must file annually to maintain their tax-exempt
status. 4 That return collects from charities information about substantial donors,
meaning generally those donors to the nonprofit that provided the greater of $5,000 or
2% of total donations to the nonprofit during the year. California argued it had a
compelling interest in collecting the information in order to police fraud on charities. 5
The Court, however, found that the law chilled the free association rights of donors
without narrowly tailoring the law to the state of California’s governmental interest.
Notably, this was neither a tax case, nor a campaign finance case. Nevertheless, the
reasoning of the Court may impact the constitutionality of disclosure laws associated
with both domains of law. I will first describe the reasoning of Americans for
Prosperity Foundation, briefly discuss prior Court precedents on disclosure in the
campaign finance regime, then describe the tax law obligations of the nonprofit
organizations that tend to populate and dominate the space of the political in our
country.
2F
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The Court found that the requirement that charities confidentially disclose
substantial donors to the state of California created the unnecessary risk of the chilling
of association protected under the First Amendment. 6 The chilling effect arose because
donors feared making donations to charities in California both because the state of
California obtained the information and the consequent danger that information might
be disclosed. Though the Court seemed to apply the “exacting scrutiny” standard to a
disclosure regime such as applied previously in Buckley v. Valeo, 7 some members of the
Court were willing to apply the higher standard of strict scrutiny. 8 More significantly,
the Court ultimately added to the exacting scrutiny test that disclosure regimes need to
be narrowly tailored to the governmental interest involved. 9 While California had an
interest in preventing fraud, the Court held that the requirement was too broad and not
narrowly tailored to accomplish the governmental interest. 10 The Court believed
California used a dragnet to generate information that it believed the state of California
only needed in a much narrower set of cases. The Court highlighted that the record
developed in the court below showed that California rarely if ever used the donor
information in its investigations. 11 Crucially for the disclosure in the case of tax law or
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3 141 S.Ct. at 2385. For full disclosure, I note that I submitted an amicus brief in Americans for Prosperity
along with 11 other nonprofit scholars supporting the state of California in its effort to protect its ability to
demand this donor information from charities. Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of the Law of Non-Profit
Organizations in Support of Respondent, Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 141 S.Ct. 2373
(2021) (Nos. 19-251 & 19-255).
4 I.R.S., FORM 990, RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM TAXATION, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f990.pdf.
5 Brief of respondent Matthew Rodriquez, Acting Attorney General of California, Americans for Prosperity
Foundation v. Bonta, 141 S.Ct. 2373 (2021) (Nos. 19-251 & 19-255).
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19251/172982/20210325141442657_19%20251%2019%20255%20Brief%20on%20the%20Merits.pdf.
6 141 S.Ct. 2373, 2388.
7 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976).
8 Id. at 2390 (Thomas, J., concurring).
9 Id. at 2383-84.
10 Id. at 2385.
11 Id. at 2386.
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campaign finance law, the Court explicitly left open the possibility that the
governmental interests involved in tax collection might support disclosure. 12
11F

Campaign Finance
The legal regime of campaign finance at the federal level and generally at the
state level as well depends upon contribution limits, expenditure limits, and disclosure.
For ease, I will focus only on federal campaign finance. Modern campaign finance law
rests upon the structure created in the Federal Election Campaign Acts of 1971 and
amended in 1974, 1976 and 1979 (FECA) enacted with an intent to stymie the corruption
of money on our politics. The contribution limits limit the amount of money individuals,
parties, and political action committees (PACs) can contribute to campaigns, parties,
and PACs. 13 FECA also regulates what it refers to as “expenditures.” These are defined
as “any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or
anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for
Federal office.” 14 FECA applies limits on coordinated expenditures on federal
campaigns of national committees, state committees, and subordinate committees to the
state committees to an amount that is connected to the population of a particular
state. 15 Finally, individuals, groups, corporations and labor unions are required to
disclose to the FEC certain independent expenditures, and have disclosure obligations
upon producing or airing certain electioneering communications. 16 Federal political
committees have disclosure obligations through registration and reporting. Candidates,
national parties, and federal PACs must file quarterly reports identifying donors who
have given $200 or more. The disclosure regime provides information to the Federal
Election Commission to oversee the contribution and expenditure limits.
12F

13F

14F
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In Buckley v. Valeo, a particularly complex case, the Court generally upheld the
contribution limits because though the law impinged in part on free association rights
the government demonstrated a sufficiently important interest in preventing

Id. at 2389.
52 U.S.C. 30116(a); F.E.C. Contribution Limits for 2021–22 Federal Elections
https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/contributionlimits/#:~:text=%24100%20limit%20on%20cash%20contributions,or%20election%20to%20federal%20
office. The Supreme Court has struck down some individual limitations. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S.
185 (2014) (the Court found 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(3) (now 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(3)) limiting an individual’s
ability to aggregate contributions in a particular time period to candidates or committees
unconstitutional). 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(2); see also F.E.C. Contribution Limits for 2021–22 Federal
Elections https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/contributionlimits/#:~:text=%24100%20limit%20on%20cash%20contributions,or%20election%20to%20federal%20
office. 52 U.S.C. 30116(a); F.E.C. Contribution Limits for 2021–22 Federal Elections
https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/contributionlimits/#:~:text=%24100%20limit%20on%20cash%20contributions,or%20election%20to%20federal%20
office.
14 52 U.S.C. §30101(9). The FEC publishes the amounts annually at https://www.fec.gov/help-candidatesand-committees/making-disbursements-political-party/coordinated-party-expenditures/coordinatedparty-expenditure-limits/.
15 52 U.S.C. § 30116(d).
16 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c) & (f).
12
13
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corruption. 17 After applying an exacting scrutiny test, the Court generally found the
disclosure requirements constitutional. 18 The Court found that the disclosure furthered
three important governmental interests: (1) it provides important information to voters
in evaluating candidates; (2) it “deter[s] actual corruption and avoid[s] the appearance
of corruption;” and (3) it provides “essential means of gathering the data necessary to
detect violations of the contribution limitations.” 19 The Court finally found the
expenditure limitations the most suspect and found many of the provisions to be
unconstitutional, stating that the expenditure limitations imposed "direct and
substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech." 20
16F
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Since Buckley, while the Court has tended to uphold the contribution limits and
disclosure limits, it has continued to strike down expenditure limits. 21 In Citizens
United for instance, the Court struck down as unconstitutional a law prohibiting
corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds on express advocacy
but upheld the disclosure requirements. 22 Though Citizens United, a nonprofit
organization exempt from tax under section 501(c)(4), could have used a Political Action
Committee (“PAC”) to distribute a film critical of then candidate Hillary Clinton,
Citizens United wanted to spend money of the corporation itself. 23 The Court found that
this requirement did not alleviate the constitutional concern of infringing on the
freedom of speech of the corporation because the PAC is a separate association from the
corporation.
20F

21F
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Tax Exempt Organizations and Politics
How does tax fit into this mix? The IRS in its tax-exempt division oversees a
range of nonprofit corporate entities that engage in various levels of political activity in
its broadest sense, some of which is overseen by the FEC and some of which is only
overseen by the IRS. These entities range from section 527 political organizations,
section 501(c)(3) charitable organizations, section 501(c)(4) social welfare
organizations, and section 501(c)(6) business leagues. Many of the 527 organizations are
directly regulated by the FEC, but some are only overseen by the IRS. Though charities
are prohibited from intervening in a political campaign, many charities today either
intervene in political campaigns or engage in activity that comes close to the political
campaign intervention line. Social welfare organizations and business leagues are often
today referred to as dark money organizations. I explain more about each below.
Section 527 Political Organizations
424 U.S. at 26-29.
424 U.S. at 68.
19 424 U.S. at 66-68.
20 424 U.S. at 39.
21 SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (2010); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 135 L. Ed. 2d 795, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996) (independent expenditure limits placed
on political committees unconstitutional); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431
(2001) (Constitutional for Congress to regulate coordinated political committee expenditures because the
functional equivalent of contributions.).
22 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
23 558 U.S. at 321.
17

18
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Prior to the 1970s, the IRS mostly ignored the tax implications of political
committees or organizations. 24 They saw the contributions as gifts and non-taxable to
the entity or individual. 25 Congress enacted 527 of the Code in 1975 to manage the
taxable matters created by these political committees and organizations. 26 In 2000 and
2002, Congress amended the statute to require disclosure of donors from 527
organizations that did not specifically come within the FEC’s jurisdiction. 27 This means
the IRS directly plays a role in our campaign finance regime including providing some
public disclosure from some political organizations. It also means the disclosure of
donors under this regime is newly vulnerable after Americans for Prosperity
Foundation.
23F
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Political organizations are organized and operated primarily for what is called an
“exempt function.” An exempt function includes the “function of influencing or
attempting to influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any
individual to any Federal, State, or local public office or office in a political
organization.” 28 A section 527 organization still maintains a tax-exempt status, but is
subject to a complicated tax, primarily on its investment income. A section 527
organization that anticipates generating gross receipts in excess of $25,000 a year
generally must give notice to the IRS within 24 hours of its establishment. 29 Unlike
social welfare organizations, Section 527 organizations must publicly disclose
substantial information about their receipts of contributions and expenditures. 30
Congress considered extending these same disclosure obligations to social welfare
organizations as well, but never has. 31 If a social welfare organization, business league
or labor union engages in activities categorized as exempt function activity, the
organization is subject to the tax under section 527(f). 32 An organization described in
section 501(c) could alternatively create a segregated fund to operate as a political
organization under section 527. 33
27F

28F
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24 I.R.S., I. IRC 527 – Political Organizations, Exempt Organizations CPE Text (1989)
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopici89.pdf.
25 See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 68-19, 1968-1 C.B. 810.
26 Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-625, § 10, 88 Stat. 2108, 2116-19 (codified as amended at § 527); see
also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS UNDER SECTION 527 OF
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (2008) https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21716/4.
27 P.L. 106-230; P.L. 107-276; see also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
UNDER SECTION 527 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (2008)
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21716/4.
28 26 U.S.C. § 527.
29 They must file with the IRS a Form 8871 found here https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form8871.
30 26 U.S.C. § 527(j). Note that Political Committees that already have the obligation to file with the FEC
do not have to comply with the section 527(j) disclosure requirements. See also Form 990, Return for
Organization Exempt from Income Tax, Schedule B Schedule of Contributors Instructions; Form 8872
https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-8872.
31 See, e.g., Donald Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the
Regulatory Plumbing, 10 ELECTION L.J. 427, 430 & FN 21 (2011) (citing H. Rep. No. 106-702, at 9–11 and
H. Rep. No. 106-702, at 40–41).
32 Rev. Rul. 2004–6, 2004–1 C.B. 328.
33 26 U.S.C. § 527(f)(3).
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Charitable Organizations
Charitable organizations are exempt from tax under section 501(a) of the Code
because described in section 501(c)(3) of the Code. To be a charitable organization, the
nonprofit must be organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
or educational purposes, provided no part of the organization’s net earnings inures to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. 34 Also importantly, a charitable
organization may not engage in more than a substantial part lobbying and is completely
prohibited from intervening in a political campaign. 35 In the political sphere, most
charitable organizations rely upon either a religious or educational purpose to support
their claim to exemption. Religious organizations will often assert that they are speaking
from a religious perspective to either lobby or sometimes even to advocate for a
candidate. There are many think tank advocacy groups that today qualify under section
501(c)(3) by educating the populace about important ideas to our governance.
33F

34F

The prohibition on intervening in a political campaign means that a charity
cannot advocate for or against a candidate for political office either directly or indirectly.
The idea of lobbying imbued in section 501(c)(3) refers to efforts to encourage members
of a legislative body to propose, support, or oppose legislation. 36 Notably, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of this limitation on lobbying under the First
Amendment and the Equal Protection clause in Regan v. Taxation with
Representation. 37 Charitable organizations can, consistent with their purpose, educate
the public about important issues. 38 When this is done in the context of matters that are
being debated before the legislature, it is often referred to as issue advocacy. In turn,
issue advocacy can also often be an effective means of advocating for a candidate
without expressly advocating for a candidate. Because charitable organizations have
some ability to lobby, and an unlimited ability to educate, they can often accomplish
quite a lot of political goals. My sense is that the charitable world has become much
more politically involved today than it was even twenty years ago.
35F

36F

37F

In addition to the political aspects of charities, much of the regulatory
architecture found in section 501(c)(3) is there to prevent fraud on charity and hinder
the avoidance of income tax. For instance, the inurement provision is an absolute ban
on a private shareholder or individual from taking the earnings of charity that are
supposed to be dedicated to charitable purpose. Additionally, limitations on the use of
charities require that they be operated for a public purpose and not a private one. This
idea has become a limitation on an amount of private benefit that a charity can provide.
Again, generally this is designed to prevent abuse of charities by directing them to help
private individuals and businesses instead of helping charitable beneficiaries. One more
provision is worth noting here, Congress enacted a provision which prevents charities
from engaging in what are known as excess benefit transactions. 39 In general, this
38F

26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
Id.
36 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii).
37 Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
38 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2).
39 26 U.S.C. § 4958.
34
35
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means that the Code imposes a tax upon an individual who has some control over a
charity and takes from that charity some amount they were not entitled to. For instance,
and simplistically, someone who provides a charity $100,000 worth of services who
receives from the charity $200,000 would have an excess benefit equal to $100,000.
They would have to pay a tax on that amount and return the amount to the charity.
Finally, charitable contributions to charitable organizations are potentially deductible to
taxpayers. 40 Notably, a taxpayer may neither deduct a contribution for the purposes of
intervening in a political campaign nor for lobbying. 41
39F

40F

In order to hold charities accountable for proving their exemption, to ensure the
proper collection of tax revenue, and to provide important information to the public,
charities must annually file a Form 990 with the IRS. 42 The tax reporting of charities
also allows the IRS to ensure that taxpayers are not misusing this opportunity to deduct
contributions to an organization that do not deserve to be deducted from tax. Most of
the information on the form is disclosable to the public. The form provides financial
information about the charity as well as descriptions of the activities of the charity
during the taxable year. The Schedule B to the Form 990 seeks information about
substantial donors to the charity. The information sought includes the name and
address of the donor along with the contribution amount to the charity. 43 The
information on donors is generally not disclosable to the public except in the cases of
section 527 political organizations and private foundation. 44 It is not clear whether that
requirement of disclosure on the Form will meet the exacting scrutiny test applied by
the Court in Americans for Prosperity Foundation to the very similar requirement
applied to enforce state nonprofit law. I believe the information is needed to enforce
many of the above provisions to ensure the proper collection of revenue and to protect
charity from fraud. It also can act as a deterrent against misuse of charitable dollars in
the way red light cameras deter drivers from running red lights. Finally, it can act as a
deterrent as well to the abuse of campaign finance laws.
41F

42F

43F

Dark Money Organizations
We regularly hear in the news about dark money organizations. What are they
and how do they relate to tax and campaign finance? Dark money organizations refer to
tax exempt organizations that typically do not engage in express advocacy but do engage
in political advocacy by intervening in political campaigns and by engaging in lobbying.
The moniker “dark” means that the public has little access to knowledge about who
funds these organizations because first they need not disclose the money to the FEC
because they do not engage in the type of express advocacy that comes under its
jurisdiction. Here I am referring primarily to social welfare organizations and business
leagues. Each of these organizations is exempt from the income tax under section 501(a)
just like a charitable organization. Though these organizations file certain information
about substantial donors with the IRS, none of that information is disclosed publicly.
26 U.S.C. § 170.
26 U.S.C. 162(e).
42 26 U.S.C. § 6033.
43 I.R.S. Form 990, Schedule B, Schedule of Contributors, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990ezb.pdf.
44 26 U.S.C. § 6104(b).
40
41
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Additionally, in 2020, the IRS ended the requirement that dark money organizations
must disclose substantial donor names and addresses to the IRS on Schedule B to the
Form 990. 45
44F

Social welfare organizations must operate exclusively to promote social welfare
and prohibit inurement to any private shareholder or individual. 46 Though the statute
uses the term “exclusively” the IRS regulations state that social welfare organization
only need primarily further a social welfare purpose. 47 Though there is no hard and fast
rule on how to satisfy the primarily test, a simple rule of thumb is that an organization
must engage in more than fifty percent of activities that further its exempt purpose. This
creates challenges for IRS enforcement in determining when a social welfare
organization has crossed the line. Social welfare organizations are not all political
advocacy organizations. In addition to those, they include health maintenance
organizations, civic social clubs like Kiwanis and Rotary clubs, homeowners’
associations, and kid’s sports clubs. 48 Still, many social welfare organizations
participate in the political sphere in its broadest sense. On the one hand, a social welfare
organization may engage in lobbying activities as a social welfare purpose. 49 On the
other hand, a social welfare organization does not further its purpose when it intervenes
in a political campaign. It can be very difficult for the IRS to make the call between
activity that might be considered issue advocacy and that activity that crosses the line
into political campaign intervention. 50
45F

46F
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49F

There are of course other aspects of social welfare organizations that the IRS
oversees. An organization claiming social welfare status that does not so qualify owes
tax on its taxable income. Like charities, social welfare organizations cannot allow their
earnings to inure to the benefit of a private shareholder or individual. 51 Additionally, the
private benefit limitation and the tax under section 4958 on excess benefit transactions
applies to social welfare organizations like described above with respect to charities.
Contributions to social welfare organizations do not qualify for the charitable
contribution deduction.
50F

Social welfare organizations must file a Form 990 just like a charity. Its return is
public as well. The return both serves a means of ensuring the organization complies
with its tax status, provides information that could allow the IRS to detect if there is any
85 Fed. Reg. 31959 (May 28, 2020) (codified at 26 CFR 56) T.D. 9898. See also Dark Money Darker,
supra note 2 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3855543.
46 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4).
47 26 U.S.C. 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2).
48 JEREMY KHOULISH, FROM CAMPS TO CAMPAIGN F UNDS: T HE HISTORY, A NATOMY AND ACTIVITY OF 501(C)(4)
ORGANIZATIONS, URBAN INSTITUTE, 6 (2016).
49 Rev. Rul. 68–656, 1968–2 C.B. 216.
50 A good example of the challenge is found in the IRS consideration of the application for exemption of
the major political social welfare organization associated with Karl Rove Crossroads GPS. Though the IRS
initially proposed denying the organization because many of the ads it ran appeared to be engaged in
intervening in a political campaign, the IRS ultimately granted the organization status after Crossroads
filed an appeal. See Robert Maguire, How Crossroads GPS beat the IRS and Became a Social Welfare
Group, OPEN SECRETS (February 12, 2016) https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2016/02/how-crossroadsgps-beat-the-irs-and-became-a-social-welfare-group/.
51 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(4).
45
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avoidance of tax, and provides the public information to hold these organizations
publicly accountable. Unlike the situation with charitable organizations though,
currently the IRS does not potentially run afoul of the precedent in Americans for
Prosperity Foundation on any dark money organizations because the IRS no longer
requires the organizations to disclose the names and addresses of substantial donors. I
have argued, however, that the IRS needs the information regarding substantial donors
in order to protect the revenue through knowledge about the information and through
deterrence. 52 The ending of the collection of that information also likely impacts the
integrity of the campaign finance system as individuals can contribute to social welfare
organizations with the knowledge that there is no information going to any part of the
government regarding these contributions.
51F

Business leagues present many of the same issues as do social welfare
organizations. They are exempted from the income tax under section 501(c)(6) and
include “[b]usiness leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, boards of trade,
or professional football leagues.” 53 A business league must be formed to promote a
common business interest and must direct its activities towards the improvement of
business conditions in one or more lines of business as distinguished from the
performance of particular services for individual persons. 54 These organizations broadly
support various industries or professions through education, advertising, networking,
lobbying. Similarly, to social welfare organizations business leagues are prohibited from
allowing their earnings from inuring to a private shareholder or individual.
52F

53F

Just like social welfare organizations, lobbying is a permissible purpose of a
business league. 55 Though it is unclear whether intervening in a political campaign
furthers a business league purpose, it is more likely than not that it does not such as is
the case with social welfare organizations. 56 The practical result of this regime is that
business leagues can do unlimited lobbying, assuming it furthers the organizations
purpose, and can do a significant amount of activities that might intervene in a political
campaign. Thus, these organizations can potentially engage in quite a bit of activity that
has impacts on elections without providing much disclosure to the public or even the
government today.
54F

55F

I believe the interest in ensuring proper collection of revenue and in deterring
controlling individuals from taking advantage of business leagues is significant in the
case of business leagues as well. I believe the substantial donor information is important
to the enforcement of the tax law in the case of these organizations such that the IRS
should again collect that information. 57 However, the IRS would need to be able to meet
56F

Dark Money Darker, supra note 2.
26 U.S.C. 501(c)(6).
54 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)–1.
55 Rev. Rul. 61–177, 1961–2 C.B. 117.
56 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233 (Dec. 3, 1969). Campaign finance law also significantly impacts the
operation of business leagues in the political campaign sphere. For instance, a business league, as a
corporation, is subject to the law that they use “separate segregated funds” as controlled political action
committees to make contributions to candidates for federal political campaigns. 52 U.S.C. 30118; 11 C.F.R.
§§ 114.1(a)(2)(iii) & 114.5.
57 Dark Money Darker, supra note 2.
52
53
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the exacting scrutiny test of Americans for Prosperity Foundation in order to collect
that information in a way that does not violate the Constitution. The failure to collect
this information though likely does not just impact the integrity of the tax system, but
likely impacts the integrity of our campaign finance system.
In the case of both social welfare organizations and business leagues the IRS
needs to be able to determine the quantity of political campaign activity in which these
organizations engage. 58 This is in part because an organization that primarily engages in
that intervention activity, is considered for tax purposes as an organization described in
section 527. An organization described in section 501(c)(4) or (6) could alternatively
create a segregated fund to operate as a political organization (i.e., a PAC) under section
527. 59 Note that a charity may not create a PAC directly. However, it can form a social
welfare organization and that social welfare organization can in turn form a PAC.
57F

58F

Conclusion
Thank you for inviting me to speak about the important issue of disclosure of
donors associated with nonprofit organizations and the relationship of that to campaign
finance regimes as well as its larger relationship to the tax obligations of these nonprofit
organizations. I believe that the First Amendment freedom of association is a key
component of the operation of our governmental system. I am concerned that the
Supreme Court may have pushed the limits of it too far in Americans for Prosperity. It
has the potential to undermine the already weak enforcement environment associated
with nonprofits. That said, we have other regimes that this disclosure regime depends
upon including campaign finance and the taxation of exempt organizations. Legislators
need to keep this new precedent on disclosure in mind and work to ensure that they
have a substantial governmental purpose in mind as they design any disclosure regime
and ensure that the tool used for enforcement is narrowly tailored to that government
interest. As a concluding matter, I would also be glad to discuss generally the state law
obligations of nonprofit organizations including the role of the attorney general of
enforcing those.

58 Rev. Rul. 2004–6, 2004–1 C.B. 328 (describes circumstances where social welfare organizations, labor
unions, and business leagues conduct too much intervention into a political campaign).
59 26 U.S.C. § 527(f)(3).
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